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I. INTRODUCTION** 
Diplomacy has proven time and time again to, arguably, be the most 
effective tool in dealing with some of the world’s most high-stakes, 
international disputes.1  Despite its proven track record of success, there 
has always been a sense, as it related to the protracted conflict between 
Iran and the West—particularly the United States, that diplomacy might 
give way to armed conflict, full-blown proxy wars, and/or covert 
operations.2 
On July 14, 2015, those long-standing fears were largely allayed 
when Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) 
with the United States, China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and 
Germany (the P5+1), which “cut off every single path” Iran had to a 
nuclear weapon.3  Adopted by the United Nations Security Council 
through Resolution 2231, the JCPOA addresses only Iran’s nuclear 
program and serves as the guiding principle for the parties to adhere to in 
the years to come.4  Despite President Donald Trump’s May 8, 2018, 
cancellation of American commitments to the deal, the JCPOA not only 
remains an active reminder of what President Barack Obama considers to 
be his most significant foreign policy achievement, but also serves as a 
testament to the determination both sides of the deal exhibited in making 
sure opposing political and social ideologies do not extinguish this 
delicate diplomatic flame.5 
 
** Due to the tremendous timeliness regarding the subject matter of this Note, the facts, figures 
and findings are true and effective as of May 13, 2018. 
 1  Stephen M. Walt, Which Works Best: Force or Diplomacy?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 1 , 
2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/21/which-works-best-force-or-diplomacy/. 
 2  Obama: ‘All Options Are On The Table’ With Iran, CBS D.C. (Mar. 20, 2013, 3:29 
PM) http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/03/20/obama-all-options-are-on-the-table-with-ira 
n/. 
 3  David Blair & Ruth Sherlock, Barack Obama: US Diplomacy has ‘Cut Off’ Iran’s 
‘Path to a Nuclear Bomb’, TELEGRAPH  (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wo 
rldnews/barackobama/12104633/Barack-Obama-Iran-cannot-get-their-hands-on-a-nucle 
ar-bomb.html.  
 4  S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015); Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 5  Mark Landler, Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-
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The concerted effort of all involved parties should now be the 
preservation and expansion of mutually-assured adherence to the 
agreement, as well as an avoidance of any policies or practices that inhibit 
the JCPOA’s objectives during Donald Trump’s unconventional and 
unpredictable presidency.  Having conducted the laborious task of 
negotiating and reaching this landmark deal, the diplomats reached “the 
most critical stage” of “fostering an atmosphere of mutual respect and 
understanding whereby the negotiating parties can move forward in 
assuring the JCPOA’s comprehensive implementation.”6 
The JCPOA was created to “produce the comprehensive lifting of 
all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national 
sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program[].”7  That is, “the JCPOA did 
not resolve, nor was it intended to resolve concerns outside of the nuclear 
arena”—namely human rights concerns, Iran’s support for resistance 
groups, or Iran’s influence in other countries within the Middle East.8  
Because the JCPOA is related solely to Iran’s nuclear activities, the deal 
has only “produce[ed] the comprehensive lifting of all United Nations 
Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions 
related to Iran’s nuclear program[.]”9  Thus, prior to May 8, 2018, while 
President Trump could have still imposed sanctions on Iran for what he 
deemed to be other “malign activities” in non-nuclear areas;10 he could 
not have reintroduced the lifted sanctions under the guise of other 
justifications, such as ballistic missiles testing.11 
While the JCPOA was signed by six nations, this Note will analyze 
the impact and the relations of the United States and Iran in the post-deal 
era.  This Note is comprised of four main Parts: Part I outlines the history 
of United States-Iran relations from the time of the Pahlavi Dynasty 
 
deal.html; On Borrowed Time, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2016), http://www.economist.com/new 
s/middle-east-and-africa/21710278-outgoing-american-presidents-biggest-foreign-policy-
achievement-now-looks.  
 6  Omid Irani, A Win for Diplomacy and the World, IRAN REV. (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/A-Win-for-Diplomacy-and-the-World.htm. 
 7  S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 4, at 2. 
 8  Statement by Jack Lew, Treasury Sec’y, on The Anniversary of The Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (July 14, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl0516.aspx. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Karen DeYoung, U.S. Slaps New Sanctions on Iran, After Certifying its Compliance 
with Nuclear Deal, WASH. POST (July 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/us-certifies-that-iran-is-meeting-terms-of-nuclear-deal/2017/07/17/58d0a3 
62-6b4a-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html?utm_term=.7004cb4b63a8. 
 11  Id.; Peter Baker, Trump Recertifies Iran Nuclear Deal, But Only Reluctantly, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear- 
deal-recertify.html?_r=0. 
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through the 1979 Islamic Revolution, while simultaneously highlighting 
events that helped foster, if not explicitly create, the animosity between 
the two nations.  Part II follows the origin and evolution of the Iranian 
nuclear program beginning in the 1950s with American help, support, and 
encouragement.  Part III tracks the diplomatic efforts, progress, and 
dealings that ultimately culminated in the signing of the JCPOA in 
Vienna.12  This section will also examine post-JCPOA era, focusing on 
Iran’s commitment and the impediments still faced by prospective 
foreign investors resulting from internationally-perceived American foot-
dragging on economic sanctions relief as well as the ramifications that 
will befall various international parties after the United States’ about-face 
vis-à-vis the nuclear deal.  Lastly, Part IV will highlight the importance 
of preserving the spirit, intent, and objectives of the nuclear deal as the 
basis for further cooperation between Iran and the United States in areas 
of mutual interests—namely stabilizing the Middle East. 
This Note argues that, while both sides expected that the removal of 
nuclear-related sanctions would serve as the baseline incentive for 
continuing adherence to the JCPOA, the agreement runs a real risk of 
collapsing due in large part to the concerns that international investors 
and companies face when seeking to invest in Iran in light of the 
reinstatement of American sanctions.  Prior to America’s upending of the 
deal, there was a sentiment that, in an effort to ensure the survival of the 
JCPOA, both Iran and the United States would have to pull their 
respective weight.  Iran would have continued its documented 
compliance with the terms and obligations entered into at the negotiating 
table.  In exchange, the American government should have, either 
through explicit guarantees or implicit assurances, fostered a sense of 
understanding with wary international investors who feared that any 
investment in Iran would lead to hefty penalties by the U.S. Treasury 
Department.  A prominent New York City sanctions lawyer highlighted 
this point: “Many of the major European-based financial institutions have 
recently been involved in enforcement proceedings because of problems 
they’ve had with [American sanctions.]”13  Ultimately, according to 
experts in the field, “banks want the maximum certainty” that they will 
not be subject to American sanctions if they conduct business with Iran.14  
 
 12  Julian Borger, Iran Nuclear Deal Reached in Vienna, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/iran-nuclear-deal-expected-to-be-announce 
d-in-vienna. 
 13  Ladene Nasseri et al., What Investors Need to Know About Entering Iran’s Stock 
Market, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-17/ 
what-investors-need-to-know-about-entering-iran-s-stock-market. 
 14  Fabio Benedetti Valentini & Ladene Nasseri, Europe’s Banks Are Staying Out of Iran, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-03/europe-s-
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In the absence of certainty, it becomes easier to see why Iran would still 
feel choked off by sanctions, resulting in the greater potentiality that Iran 
will walk away from the JCPOA. 
II. THE HISTORICAL TIES AND TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND IRAN 
Once great allies, the United States and Iran have recently 
experienced decades of non-bilateral communications.  Such a reality is 
due in some degree to America’s once long-standing influence and 
control over Iran’s government and rulers prior to 1979.  Nevertheless, 
both sides have committed sizeable transgressions, which have 
undoubtedly contributed to the war of words and ideas that have come to 
define American-Iranian relations since 1979. 
A. The Pahlavi Dynasty: An Instrument for the American Agenda 
Long before toxic vitriol divided the Middle East and much of the 
Anglophonic West, Iran was “one of America’s closest allies.”15  The 
Pahlavi Dynasty, coming to power in 1925, served as a satisfactory, 
secular partner for America’s ideological and foreign policy-oriented 
agendas.16  This partnership explains why Iranian history, at the turn of 
the twentieth century, was rife with American fingerprints: “The Pahlavi 
state under the [S]hah came into existence with the influence and 
assistance of external powers, and continued to be supported by the 
United States in a bid to ensure the strategic interests of the capitalist 
world.”17 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), Iran’s secular king 
who kept dissenting pockets of Iran in check—even exiling a prominent 
cleric, Ruhollah Khomeini, who would later overthrow the Shah in 
1979—was the perfect partner for America.18  With Iran’s dissidents 
silenced, the United States proceeded with its de facto policy of 
“intervention in the social and political development of Iran.”19  The 
Shah’s reliance on the United States grew on a yearly basis.20  The 
 
banks-haunted-by-u-s-fines-forgo-iran-deals-amid-boom. 
 15  DOUGLAS LITTLE, AMERICAN ORIENTALISM: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE 
EAST SINCE 1945 145 (2008). 
 16  The Pahlavi Dynasty, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic 
/Pahlavi-dynasty (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 17  MARYAM PANAH, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND THE WORLD: GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF 
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 21 (2007). 
 18  JOANNA DE GROOT, RELIGION, CULTURE AND POLITICS IN IRAN: FROM THE QAJARS TO 
KHOMEINI 198 (2007). 
 19  PANAH, supra note 17, at 17. 
 20  See PANAH, supra note 17, at 20 (“Between 1953 and 1960 the United States granted 
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reliance was beyond just financial handouts.  The United States even 
“became involved in the establishment and training” of Iran’s royal 
“security apparatus”—particularly the SAVAK which “engaged in 
espionage and counter-espionage and domestic repression.”21  Such 
generous offerings were presumably tied to the Shah’s reciprocated 
gestures of serving “the geopolitical interests of the West . . . including 
the consistent support of the state of Israel, defen[se] of the U.S. 
engagement in Vietnam and adoption of a security role in the Persian 
Gulf.”22 
Domestically, the Shah was perceived as selling out Iranians who 
“believed the central direction for the shah’s policies originated in 
Washington.”23  He was “unable to handle the mounting economic and 
social problems.”24  There was “considerable debate” in Iran “on the 
extent of capitalist development” and the impact it was having on the 
working class.25  Not only did the living standards of less-skilled workers 
fail to mirror the improvements in the standard of living of their working 
class countrymen, “increasing inflation” and a “rise in housing prices put 
considerable material pressure” on the backbone of Iran’s population.26  
Such sentiment was certainly not eased by the rampant “perception that 
the Pahlavi state and its chief supporter[,] the United States[,] were the 
root cause of Iran’s problems.”27  The Shah was widely chided as having 
become “America’s Shah.”28 
The Shah eventually lost touch with reality, his people in Iran, and 
“Iranian students [who] were studying abroad during the 1970s.”29  There 
is no shortage of examples demonstrating the Shah’s “offensive and 
insulting” attitude toward his people.30  He repeatedly exhibited 
grandiose notions of eclipsing Western standards of living.31  In his haste 
to “catch up” and reach his goals, he tacitly blamed the people of Iran as 
 
$567 million in economic and $450 million in military aid to Iran.”). 
 21  PANAH, supra note 17, at 20. 
 22   PANAH, supra note 17. 
 23  Richard Cottam, Goodbye America’s Shah, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 1, 2017), http://forei 
gnpolicy.com/1979/03/16/goodbye-to-americas-shah/. 
 24  TAREQ Y. ISMAEL ET AL., GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE 
EAST: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 171 (2nd ed. 2016). 
 25  PANAH, supra note 17, at 21-22. 
 26  PANAH, supra note 17, at 29-30. 
 27  PANAH, supra note 17, at 40. 
 28  Cottam, supra note 23. 
 29  PANAH, supra note 17, at 34. 
 30  Marvin Zonis, IRAN: A Theory of Revolution From Accounts of the Revolution, 35 
WORLD POL. 586, 600 (1983). 
 31  Id. 
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being the biggest hindrance to achieving such a way of life.32  He claimed, 
“[i]f our nation wished to remain in the circle of dynamic, progressive 
and free nations of the world, it had no alternative but to completely alter 
the archaic order of society . . . .”33  He made no attempt to assess or 
understand his people’s visions and needs, and made little effort to 
explain why his trumped theirs.34  A prevailing criticism was that “he 
showed Iranians no compassion and no empathy.”35  The culmination of 
a departure from traditional Iranian norms and the “feelings of betrayal 
and frustration, were significant sources of the revolutionary energy that 
culminated in the overthrow of the Shah.”36  A new man would soon 
answer the people’s calls and take his place. 
B. Iran’s Islamic Revolution: Governance and Departure from 
American Influence 
Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 
who later became Iran’s first Supreme Leader, helped establish the 
system of governance, which Iran retains today, after they successfully 
overthrew the American-backed monarchy and sent the Shah into 
permanent exile.37  The Shah’s push toward modernization had soured 
Iranians’ perception of the West to the point where “defense against 
‘Westernization’ became a major political issue.”38  In a blatant departure 
from his predecessor’s position, Khomeini publicly chastised America’s 
once-expansive role in Iran and instead pushed for Iranian “self-
sufficiency,” declaring: “If we succeed in finding our true selves . . . we 
shall be able to . . . do and make anything.”39  In order to accomplish this, 
however, the structure of the new government had to embody Khomeini’s 
vision for his new country. 
The current manifestations of Iranian governance can be traced to a 
pair of 1979 referenda, which helped cement the creation of the Islamic 
Republic.  The first and most decisive vote, approved by ninety-eight 
percent of all voters, asked simply, “Islamic Republic: yes or no.”40  
Shortly thereafter, ninety-nine percent of voters approved the draft 
 
 32  PANAH, supra note 17, at 24. 
 33  Zonis, supra note 30. 
 34  Zonis, supra note 30. 
 35  Zonis, supra note 30. 
 36  Zonis, supra note 30, at 599. 
 37  The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbo 
ok/geos/printir.html (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 38  PANAH, supra note 17, at 36. 
 39  EVALEILA PESARAN, IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: REFORM AND 
COUNTER-REFORM IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA 70 (2011). 
 40  YASMIN ALEM, DUALITY BY DESIGN: THE IRANIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 65 (2011). 
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constitution, formally ushering in the Islamic Republic of Iran with its 
government embodying a dual system of democratic and theocratic 
facets—an “inherent contradiction” that Iran has been grappling with 
since the Revolution.41  Such gargantuan support, though, is typical with 
referenda held in the wake of popular revolutions, especially in Iran’s 
case, where many Iranians treated the Ayatollah and his revolutionaries 
as “saviors of the oppressed.”42 
The complexity and innate incongruity of Iran’s governing political 
structure cannot be understated or overlooked.  At its core, Iran is a 
theocratic system of government that is intertwined with democratic 
elements.43  This intermeshing of two seemingly incoherent governing 
styles is overseen by an “ultimate political authority vested in a learned 
religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, 
according Iran’s constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of 
Experts—a popularly elected 86-member body of clerics.”44  
Notwithstanding its perception as a religious dictatorship, democratic 
traditions are present in Iran: Iran’s legislators and President are both 
voted in by the citizenry on four-year terms, lawmakers robustly argue 
issues of significance against various political and ideological parties, and 
presidential candidates are even put through the gauntlet of publicly 
televised debates that become so passionate they sometimes turn 
“personal.”45  Summarily, there is no shortage of “jockey[ing] for power” 
between those atop Iran’s governmental power structure.46 
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has overseen the country’s 
most pressing issues since he assumed the position in 1989.47  
“Khamenei’s central position as Supreme Leader affords him the capacity 
to broadly shape the overall direction of the Islamic Republic.”48  In fact, 
 
 41  S. WAHAR HASIB, THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION: AN EXERCISE IN CONTRADICTIONS 4 
(2004). 
 42  Scott Peterson, Iran: 20 Years After Ayatollah Khomeini, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0605/p06s04-wome.ht 
ml. 
 43  CIA, supra note 37; Max Fisher, How Do Iran’s Supreme Leader and President Split 
Power? Here’s a Chart Explaining It, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/06/14/how-do-irans-supreme-leader-and-president-spli 
t-power-heres-a-chart-explaining-it/. 
 44  CIA, supra note 37; Fisher, supra note 43. 
 45  Jason Rezaian, Iran’s Presidential Debate Gets Personal, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/irans-presidential-debate-gets-p 
ersonal/2013/06/07/e0584e32-cf9c-11e2-8573-3baeea6a2647_story.html. 
 46  Fisher, supra note 43.  
 47  Akbar Ganji, Who Is Ali Khamenei?, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 24, 32 (2013). 
 48  ALIREZA NADER, DAVID E. THALER, & S. R. BOHANDY, RAND, THE NEXT SUPREME 
LEADER 2 (2011). 
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“much of his strength rests on his presumed moral authority and his 
skillful orchestration of informal networks, as well as recent shifts in the 
international and domestic context.”49  The evolving level of “increased 
international pressure on Iran has enabled Khamenei to bolster the 
revolution’s sagging legitimacy and discredit any moves toward reform 
as externally inspired.”50 
With the political dynamics outlined, this Note will now discuss how 
the Iranian nuclear program came about, and how it became a pressing 
international concern. 
III. IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: FROM INFANCY TO MATURATION 
The genesis of the Iranian nuclear program occurred when the 
United States and Iran were close allies.51  Around the mid- twentieth 
century, America’s official governmental policies and scientific 
capability introduced Iran to the path of nuclear energy and enrichment.52  
Along that journey the United States and Iran had a major divergence, 
and Iran’s American-made nuclear program became a contentious 
symbol of the alliance that was. 
A. “Atoms for Peace” Program 
Iran’s nuclear program “is a creation of the United States.”53  Under 
America’s Atoms for Peace program, the “United States . . . provided 
research reactors and enriched uranium to countries such as Iran,” laying 
the foundation for Iran’s nuclear program beginning in 1957.54  The 
United States assisted Iran in gaining an understanding of nuclear power 
through the former’s exportation of heavily enriched uranium to the latter 
“in the 1960s for use in a research reactor,55 located in Tehran,”56 which 
 
 49  JERROLD D. GREEN, FREDERIC WEHREY, & CHARLES WOLF, JR., RAND, 
UNDERSTANDING Iran 7 (2009). 
 50  Id.  
 51  Greg Bruno, Iran’s Nuclear Program, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 15, 2017), htt 
ps://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-nuclear-program. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Steve Inskeep, Born In The USA: How America Created Iran’s Nuclear Program, 
NPR (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/09/18/440567960/born-
in-the-u-s-a-how-america-created-irans-nuclear-program. 
 54  MATHEW FURHMANN, ATOMIC ASSISTANCE 2 (2012); Ariana Rowberry, Sixty Years of 
“Atoms for Peace” and Iran’s Nuclear Program, BROOKINGS (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.b 
rookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/12/18/sixty-years-of-atoms-for-peace-and-irans-nuclear-pr 
ogram/. 
 55  “Research reactors are used for training purposes or to produce isotopes that have 
medical applications.” FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 16. 
 56  FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 15. 
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is still functional and in operation.57  For a period of over twenty years, 
American administrations from President Eisenhower’s to Carter’s 
forged nuclear cooperation agreements with Iran with the intent of 
developing its nuclear energy industry.58  A declassified study shows that 
the United States had an interest in becoming “a major source of the 
equipment as well as the technology used” in Iran’s then-fledgling 
nuclear program.59  Ironically, the atomic aid the United States so openly 
provided ended up “contributing to Iran’s nuclear weapons program” 
when all cooperation between the two countries ceased after Iran’s 1979 
Revolution.60 
B. The Origin and Evolution of the Iranian Sanctions Regime 
Economic sanctions have long been a favorite tool of U.S. foreign 
policy.61  From the end of World War II to 1990, the United States 
imposed two-thirds of all global sanctions.62  As an additional 
perspective, “[b]etween its formation in 1945 and [August 6, 1990], the 
United Nations had imposed sanctions only twice in its history[, whereas] 
the United States used sanctions about twice a year for a total of about 
one hundred times.  But since 2000, the implementation rate has risen 
fifty percent to about three per year.”63  American policymakers have 
been enticed by sanctions because they seem more substantial than “mere 
diplomacy” and do not present the risks or costs of military intervention.64  
However, if used wantonly, sanctions can inflict enormous harm to a 
country with a small or vulnerable economy.  A perfect example which 
is Iran.  Despite the fact that it has repeatedly been shown that 
“sanctions . . . have failed to achieve any of their major goals,” the United 
States led a significantly sweeping sanctions regime.65  Such outcomes 
are typical and largely hurt ordinary citizens.66  In short, economic 
 
 57  Research purposes were, and in many respects still are, the reasoning Iran uses for 
continuing its legal nuclear program.  Inskeep, supra note 53. 
 58  FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 82-88. 
 59  FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 82 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60  FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 84. 
 61  Joy Gordon, ‘Smart Sanctions’ on Iran are Dumb, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS (Sept. 20, 
2016), http://fpif.org/smart_sanctions_on_iran_are_dumb/. 
 62  Id. 
 63  P.R. KUMARASWAMY, CAUGHT IN CROSSFIRE: CIVILIANS IN CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST 178-79 (2008). 
 64  Gordon, supra note 61. 
 65  HOSSEIN ALIKHANI, SANCTIONING IRAN: ANATOMY OF A FAILED POLICY 408 (2000). 
 66  Much like in Iraq during the 1990s, Iran today is largely dependent on oil exports for 
revenue creation.  Thus, any action preventing such transactions helped create a devastating 
collateral effect on the ordinary Iranian population.  Matt W. Dawson, How Economic 
Sanctions Affect Poor People, FEDERALIST (Feb. 13, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2015/ 
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sanctions have tangible consequences for average Iranians.67 
“The U.S. has a long history of sanctioning Iran . . . starting with 
Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, and continuing through the ‘80s and 
into today.68  American sanctions against Iran derive their prologue from 
the International Emergency Powers Act of 1977 (“IEEPA”)69—a power 
invoked for the first time by President Carter through Executive Order 
1217070 in response to, and ten days after, the takeover of the American 
embassy in Tehran.71  President Carter declared a national emergency on 
November 14, 1979, and prevented the transfer or removal of “all 
property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its 
instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran 
which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States . . . .”72 
These economic sanctions, later expanded by President Reagan, 
accompanied by retaliatory Iranian measures against American interests, 
set the stage for decades of animus, generations of mistrust, and a bevy 
of missed opportunities.73  Consequently, the diplomatic needle began to 
shift away from an allegiance and toward an inevitable clash of two 
powerful, prideful, and prominent countries. 
The voluminous increase of American sanctions against Iran has 
come into existence courtesy of numerous justifications.74  
Rationalizations for such sweeping sanctions originated with the 
American hostage crisis, later to be superseded by the desire to rebuke 
Iran over its ties to resistance groups across the Middle East that the 
United States deemed to be terrorists, then to human rights concerns 
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before culminating with the punishment of Iran’s legal nuclear program.75  
To date, a majority of the American-imposed sanctions against Iran are 
statutorily authorized under the IEEPA.76  True to form and keeping in 
line with American precedent, President Trump has continued the IEEPA 
national emergency designation against Iran.77  This authorizes the 
President to utilize coercive economic power as a means to counter “any 
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or 
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a 
national emergency with respect to such threat.”78 
As per the IEEPA, the President can assign sanctions enforcement 
to the Office of Foreign Asset Controls (“OFAC”), a subdivision of U.S. 
Department of the Treasury.79  The OFAC is tasked with overseeing and 
enforcing America’s sanctions policy.80  One of OFAC’s duties is to 
monitor the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list 
(“SDN list”),81 by ensuring that private entities do not violate American 
sanctions by conducting business with those on the SDN list.82 
Two post-9/11 developments greatly enhanced the President’s 
already powerful IEEPA powers.  First, Executive Order 13224 
essentially allowed any actor who “commit[s]” or “support[s] terrorism” 
under the umbrella of IEEPA sanctions,83 thus bringing them under the 
purview of the SDN list.84  Such a classification is important in that it 
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allows for the immediate blocking or freezing of any US-based assets 
involved in business with such entities, and also lodge civil or criminal 
charges for any business dealings that are in violation of such 
proscriptions.85 
The second development was the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act (“PATRIOT Act”), a law passed in the shadow 
of September 11, 2001.86  Among other things, the PATRIOT Act allows 
entities who have been designated as “primary money laundering 
concerns”87 to be penalized through “prohibiting the opening or 
maintenance of any correspondent or payable-through accounts” among 
U.S. financial institutions.88  The PATRIOT Act also permits the United 
States to confiscate assets in the United States belonging to the 
aforementioned entities if they are deemed to have violated any aspect of 
the American sanctions regime.89  With these powers in its arsenal, the 
United States was well-equipped with a bevy of economic armaments it 
could use against Iran. 
OFAC’s aim at the international banking system “deepen[ed] Iran’s 
financial isolation” by restricting its access to the global financial 
system.90  Using the threat of sanctions, the United States gave a 
ultimatum to other nations: conduct business with Iran or the United 
States.91  Given that the United States is the “largest national economy on 
Earth . . . most countries chose the United States.”92  Further “tightening 
the economic noose,”93 the United States employed secondary sanctions94 
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against Iran.95  This tactic was first utilized in the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act.96  These measures, combined with other sanctions, made 
it nearly impossible for Iran to conduct business internationally.97 
Europe, following the lead of the United States, also applied 
financial pressure on Iran. As a response to American action, the Society 
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”), 
which connects more than 10,000 financial institutions and corporations 
in 210 countries, announced in 2012 that it would terminate access to over 
two dozen Iranian banks.98  SWIFT’s announcement came just one day 
after President Obama met with British Prime Minister David Cameron 
in a show of unity.99  Just like that, almost instantly, two of the world’s 
largest markets, the United States and Europe, were shut off to Iran. 
The conglomeration of American-imposed and lobbied sanctions 
financially isolated Iran from the rest of the world.  One by one, 
international monetary institutions were forced to sever business ties with 
Iran, torpedoing its economy and the way of life for its eighty million 
citizens.100  This set the stage for the showdown that endures, in many 
ways, to this day. 
C. The Cost of Sanctions 
Proponents101 of sanctions often advocate for “smart” or “targeted” 
sanctions—that is, sanctions that are “focused on specific individuals, 
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entities, sectors, and/or regions of a country” as a means to evade the 
perception of collective punishment.102  Yet, even these variations create 
humanitarian consequences that affect ordinary citizens.103  Almost 
invariably, sanctions impact “the poorest and most vulnerable” segments 
of a population.104  In fact, studies have shown that “nearly all unilateral 
sanctions fail nearly all the time.”105  Moreover, the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (“CSIS”) released a report which detailed that 
“engagement with countries whose behaviors is offensive has a better 
record of accomplishment, with less damage to U.S. interests, than does 
cutting off most economic and political contact through comprehensive 
unilateral sanctions.”106  It has famously been said that the 
implementation of Draconian economic sanctions is “like applying a 
meat-cleaver where laser surgery would be more appropriate.”107  
“Comprehensive unilateral economic sanctions are almost always 
ineffective,” and largely fail to meaningfully deliver on their lofty 
promises.108 
Both the United States and Iran pay the price for the international 
economic sanctions that have come to hamper their respective economies.  
While the economic toll on the Iranian side is well documented, the 
effects on the United States, as it relates to lost opportunities, are 
understated, but equally stark.  One could argue, as the National Iranian 
American Council (“NIAC”) did, that “the United States is by far the 
biggest loser of all sanctions enforcing nations.”109  “From 1995 to 2012, 
the United States sacrificed between $134.7 and $175.3 billion in 
potential export revenue to Iran” and an average of between roughly 
51,000 and 66,500 “lost job opportunities each year” due to its dogged 
enforcement of Iranian sanctions.110  These estimates reflect only the loss 
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from export-based industries, and do not include the detrimental 
economic effects of other Iran-targeted sanctions, such as, higher global 
oil prices.111  Thus, as NIAC calculated it, the total cost to the U.S. 
economy is likely “even higher” than that which is estimated.112 
D. America’s Missed Opportunity 
Iran’s religious leaders have consistently denied allegations they 
ever wished to acquire a nuclear weapon, going so far as to issue a 
religious edict (a fatwa) that such a weapon is forbidden by Islam.113  In 
2003, in an effort to allay American and European fears, Iran even offered 
to discuss the state of its nuclear program.114  Dubbed the “Grand 
Bargain,” Iran’s proposal included full transparency on the matter and 
withdrawal of support for Hamas and Hezbollah, in exchange for security 
guarantees from the United States and a return to normalized diplomatic 
relations.115 
As an affirmation of their seriousness, Iran entered into a negotiated 
arrangement with European parties, which yielded a “detailed suspension 
agreement.”116  In an even more blatant signal of sincerity and a 
“confidence building measure,” Iran voluntarily “continue[d] and 
extend[ed] its suspension to include all enrichment related and 
reprocessing activities.”117  However, all this was for naught when 
President Bush decided to “rebuff this overture without any attempt at 
verification or follow-up” because of perceived American insecurity 
surrounding the authenticity of Iran’s proposal and concern over 
“ambiguities surrounding the Iranian leadership’s endorsement of the 
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proposal.”118  Thus, efforts to reach a deal on Iran’s nuclear program 
collapsed when they were ripest. 
Indeed, the nuclear issue plaguing Iran and the West has “been a 
symptom, not a cause, of mistrust and conflict.”119 
III. LET’S MAKE A DEAL 
Recognizing the unsuitability of their intractable ways, the United 
States and Iran both seized on the elections of their respective pragmatic 
presidents, Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, in order to bring decades 
of hostility to a close.  Opting for a diplomatic engagement, the United 
States and Iran demonstrated to the world and naysayers that diplomacy 
was not an arcane vestige of the past, but an essential ingredient in 
resolving the two sides’ most festering issues—American sanctions in 
response to Iran’s nuclear program.  Yet, despite all the fanfare 
surrounding this historic achievement, the JCPOA’s most recent results 
and implementation left, and continue to leave, a lot to be desired. 
A. The History and Negotiations of the JCPOA 
The re-election of President Obama in the United States and the 
election of President Rouhani in Iran, in 2012 and 2013 respectively, 
proved to be a harbinger of diplomacy that had often evaded American-
Iranian dialogue.  President Obama won his 2008 campaign and his 2012 
re-election bid running on a platform that was skeptical toward military 
intervention and buttressed by his dream of a “world without nuclear 
weapons.”120  Over 6,000 miles away in Tehran, the landslide election of 
President Rouhani reinforced the notion that Iranians wanted to re-engage 
diplomatically and reintegrate with the world and its economy.121  Such 
a convergence of seemingly irreconcilable positions helped prime the 
atmosphere for the historic negotiations leading to the JCPOA. 
Less than five months after President Rouhani’s inauguration, Iran 
agreed to the Joint Plan of Action (“JPOA”)—a preliminary, non-binding 
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agreement,122 which served as the precursor for the JCPOA.123  The JPOA 
was an interim agreement, which called for a six-month freeze of 
elements of Iran’s nuclear program, in exchange for narrow sanctions 
relief.124  The logic behind such a negotiated arrangement was that, with 
the modest success of the JPOA, both sides could work “in good faith” 
toward reaching an enduring pact.125  After much hysteria and fanfare, 
Iran and the P5+1 finalized the JCPOA on July 14, 2015.126  The United 
Nations Security Council then unanimously approved the agreement in 
Security Council Resolution 2231, affording the JCPOA the credence of 
international law.127 
In the aftermath of the deal, a pair of dissenting nations, Saudi 
Arabia and Israel, insecure in their own regional standing and dealing 
with unstable constituencies, decried the JCPOA as a “bad mistake of 
epic proportions.”128  Yet, bloviating statements from such pockets were 
ignored as the rest of the world ushered in this “important success,” which 
would “make our world a safer place.”129  As for the two major parties 
involved, the United States and Iran were very pleased at their diplomatic 
triumph.  President Obama and his Secretary of State John Kerry called 
the JCPOA a good deal.130  Their Iranian counterparts, President 
Rouhani131 and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, both called the 
outcome a “win-win”.132 
This historic deal verifiably bound Iran to its word that it will not 
build uranium-enrichment facilities for a period of fifteen years.133  
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Additionally, a comprehensive inspection regime was established to 
monitor and confirm that Iran was complying with its JCPOA 
commitments.134  Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to, among 
other terms, reduce its stockpile of uranium by ninety-eight percent, 
drastically dismantle its inventory of centrifuges from 20,000 to roughly 
6,000, and redesign a heavy-water facility to make production of 
weapons-grade plutonium impossible.135  Iran even agreed to have the 
number of International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”)136 inspectors 
assigned to its nuclear program increase nearly three-fold from 50 to 
between 130 and 150.137  In exchange for accepting these intrusive 
measures, Iran enjoyed having its assets in foreign banks, estimated to be 
about $100 billion, unfrozen, and also received a reprieve from American 
enforcement of its nuclear-related secondary sanctions.138 
Despite the varied international sentiments directed toward the 
JCPOA, it is worthwhile to note that the policy of seeking normalized 
engagement in an atmosphere of mistrust is littered with uncertainty and 
the fear of inevitable failure.  As Suzanne Maloney, an expert on Iran, 
wrote, “the failure of talks can always be depicted as a predictable 
outcome to an uncertain engagement with a long-time adversary.”139  It 
is no wonder that the term “engagement” has become “one of the trickiest 
terms in the policy lexicon.”140  Accordingly, it would be wise for each 
remaining party to the deal to practice prudence and diligence in their 
conduct toward each other in order to incentivize the continued adherence 
to and preservation of the fragile JCPOA. 
B. Iran’s Commitment to the JCPOA 
Having been on the receiving end of years of antagonism, exclusion, 
and derision, Iran’s economy found itself “newly connected to most of 
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the world’s economy” in a manner it was not privy to before.141  Entry 
into globalism and inclusion was “ineluctably associated with both 
economic and democratic liberalism.”142  While this Note does not make 
such an argument, it nevertheless bears noting that case studies such as 
in post-WWII Germany and Japan have exhibited such tendencies.143  
Perhaps this trend might even continue in the form of Iran becoming a 
full-fledged member of the community of nations and exhibiting a more 
positive role in the post-JCPOA era. 
In March 2018, the IAEA Director General confirmed Iran’s 
continued commitment to the JCPOA when he declared that, “Iran is 
implementing its nuclear-related commitments” under the JCPOA and 
stressed that his organization had “had access to all locations that [it] 
needed to visit.”144  The IAEA concluded Iran kept its pledges and found 
no indications of any violations in its fidelity to the deal.145  America’s 
European allies also agreed with these assessments.146  So has President 
Trump’s own defense secretary, James Mattis.147  In April 2018, mere 
weeks before America’s retreat from the deal, President Trump’s State 
Department issued a report declaring that “Iran continued to fulfill its 
nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA).”148  Such declarations by key players validate Iran’s 
seriousness about meeting its responsibilities and raise questions about 
why the United States would upend an effective mechanism overseeing 
Iran’s enrichment capabilities. 
The prevailing opinion of the Iranian people since the 
implementation of the JCPOA has been positive and has been marked by 
comradery, compliance, and cooperation.149  At no point was this more 
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evident than at the ballot box, where tens of millions of Iranians voted to 
re-elect President Rouhani with an overwhelming margin and mandate.  
President Rouhani’s re-election was “especially refreshing given the 
recent rising populist trends in Europe and the U.S.,” because it  “sent a 
resounding message to the Trump administration.”150  Iran’s outlook was 
clear: its citizens demonstrated their will and their want to be “committed 
to the path of diplomacy and moderation.”151  Iran’s President entered his 
second term embodying “a sign that the Iranian people clearly desire[d] 
peaceful relations with the outside world . . . .”152  Encapsulating the 
sentiment of both scholars and government officials who deal extensively 
with Iran-related, Gary Sick, a long-time Iran expert at Columbia 
University, said analysts are “beginning to talk about Iran as a normal 
player in the Middle East,” which represents a departure from the global 
pariah it was once viewed as.153  Such accounts certainly fit the narrative 
coming out of Iran touting their well-documented sincerity to this 
international agreement.  In return for Iran’s verified initial compliance, 
President Rouhani believed that “some parties [to the deal fell] short of 
honoring some of their obligations.”154 
C. Roadblocks to Continued Cooperation 
The United States Congress, Republican members in particular, 
adopted “largely unprecedented tactics of obstructionism and sabotage” 
as it pertained to both the proposal and survival of the JCPOA.155  In the 
months leading up to the deal, forty-seven Republican senators “issued 
an ‘open letter’ addressed to the Iranian leadership that intended to 
sabotage prospects for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran by 
cultivating doubt about the credibility and reliability of the American 
president.”156  Moreover, prior to the JCPOA’s finalization, Congress 
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passed legislation aimed at strengthening its obstructionist agenda by 
reviewing any finalized deal.157  The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
of 2015 required President Obama to report to Congress any final deal in 
the negotiations.158  Additionally, various procedural hurdles were 
created for the President, making clear Congress’s purpose of not wanting 
to be circumvented in this international deal.159  The Act also explicitly 
stated that, irrespective of any potential nuclear deal, “United States 
sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles 
will remain in place . . . .”160  Ultimately the Act failed in its goal to derail 
the deal, but that did not deter lawmakers from overtly engaging in 
rhetoric aimed at “sabotaging” its implementation by vowing to “do 
everything [they could] to stop it.”161  However, lawmakers were 
successful in passing legislation requiring the President to notify 
Congress every ninety days whether Iran remained in compliance with 
the deal via a certification.162  Under American law, the President’s 
failure to issue a certification paves the way for Congress to re-impose 
sanctions on Iran, should they elect to do so.163  Such hostile sentiments 
revealed the lack of good will and sincerity vis-à-vis executing and 
implementing the JCPOA in earnest.  It is these hostilities toward the deal 
that have allowed unease and apprehension to permeate the initial sense 
of achievement among the JCPOA’s negotiators and diplomats. 
During the 2016 Presidential campaign, one of then-candidate 
Donald Trump’s most choral mantras was “rip it up”—a reference to the 
Iranian deal that President Trump vowed to renounce and renegotiate.164  
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However, despite President Trump’s hyperbolic condemnations and his 
October 2017 decertification of the deal, it took him another several more 
months to abandon the accord in full.165  Prior to decertifying the JCPOA, 
President Trump affirmatively signed off on critical sanction waivers, 
which allowed the arrangement to remain in place and even twice 
certified Iran’s cooperation with the terms of the deal.166  In January 2018, 
President Trump issued a waiver of key sanctions for a period of four 
months while declaring that this extension represented “the last chance” 
for those European countries that are parties to the deal and key backers 
of it to “fix the deal’s disastrous flaws” or face an American withdrawal 
therefrom.167  In response, England, France, and Germany proposed 
adopting new European Union sanctions against Iran in hopes of saving 
the deal, but the Europeans failed to agree on any such sanctions amid 
fears that punishing Tehran for its missile program and regional role 
would not stop U.S. President Donald Trump from abandoning the 
JCPOA.168  Such concerns, coupled with President Trump’s failure to 
issue further required waivers on sanctions against Iran before the May 
12, 2018, deadline threated the very existence of this multilateral 
agreement.169 
Secretary Mattis, publicly stated: “When America gives [its] word, 
we have to live up to it.”170  The top Republican and Democrat on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee both expressed their bipartisan support for 
remaining in the deal, maintaining that America’s adherence to its word 
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serves to advance its national security interests.171  Others argue that an 
American withdrawal therefrom amounts to a “self-inflicted wound” and 
“would be the height of stupidity.”172 
Prior to his termination, Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, had 
admitted that Iran was in “technical compliance” with the 2015 nuclear 
agreement.173  Such a statement came less than two weeks before General 
Mattis, while answering questions in a Senate hearing, said that “[if] we 
can confirm that Iran is living by the agreement . . . then clearly we 
should stay with it.”174 These echoes grew louder in March 2018 when a 
bipartisan group of more than 100 national security veterans, including 
fifty retired military officers and at least four former American 
ambassadors to Israel, endorsed the JCPOA and proclaimed that 
“President Trump should maintain the U.S. commitment to the Iran 
nuclear deal” because America gains nothing by scrapping it.175  
Removed from domestic political allegiances, even the IAEA 
unequivocally warned President Trump that the collapse of the nuclear 
deal would be a “great loss for nuclear verification and for 
multilateralism” because the international nuclear watchdog organization 
“now has the world’s most robust verification regime in place in Iran.”176  
Israeli analysts were even publicly quoted as saying that “[t]here is no 
definitive smoking gun that Iran lied since [signing the JCPOA].”177  
Such a collection of high-ranking voices overtly advocating against 
America’s withdrawal from the JCPOA underscores the gravity of the 
situation now at hand. 
In spite of this insistence, President Trump still rejected American 
involvement in the deal because of a long-harbored and significant 
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interest in decertifying and weakening the JCPOA.178  The President even 
tasked a group of White House staffers with the assignment of actively 
undermining the deal and finding a way out of it.179  With such revelations 
coming to light, it is hard to imagine how this landmark agreement 
survived for as long as it did under his watch.  This attitude was supported 
by RBC Capital Markets, a global investment bank providing expertise 
in banking, finance, and capital markets to corporations, institutional 
investors, asset managers, and governments around the world.180  Its 
managing director and global head of commodity strategy expressed their 
skepticism and pessimism in the JCPOA’s survival when she estimated 
that, “[t]he prognosis for the Iranian nuclear deal in 2018 also looks fairly 
bleak, and the persistent threat of a U.S. sanctions snapback could curtail 
foreign investment in the Iranian energy sector . . . .”181  The Eurasia 
Group, an international political risk research and consulting firm, only 
gave the JCPOA only a meager fifty-five percent chance of surviving 
President Trump’s first term in office.182  Such realities merely reinforce 
the tenuous nature that surrounded this landmark negotiation after 
President Trump took office. Mutual mistrust and frustration have now 
further intensified the landscape leading resulted in both the United States 
and Iran to accusing each other of violating the “spirit” of the deal before 
the United States finally violated it officially by leaving it.183 
With patriotic rhetoric and international scrutiny at a fever pitch, the 
stage was set for a heavyweight, diplomatic sales pitch by both the United 
States and Iran at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly.  As expected, President Trump came out swinging hard at his 
predecessor’s approach to foreign policy, the JCPOA and Iran.  By 
labelling Iran a “corrupt dictatorship” and a “rogue state whose chief 
exports are violence, bloodshed, and chaos,” President Trump once again 
reiterated his contempt for the JCPOA calling it “one of the worst and 
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most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.”184  
Iran is by no means an exemplary international state actor, yet “while Iran 
indeed is engaging in some very worrisome pursuits, the [JCPOA] is 
confined to the nuclear program.  And so the terms of the deal dictated 
that “[a]s long as Tehran is staying within those limits, Mr. Trump has no 
reason not to certify compliance.”185 
President Trump, guided by his inability to recognize the delicate 
nature of diplomacy and the significance of the United Nations audience, 
was harshly criticized for his speech by the Swedish Foreign Minister 
who remarked that, “It was the wrong speech, at the wrong time, to the 
wrong audience.”186  The following day, on the same stage, President 
Rouhani made a diligent case for Iran’s commitment to the JCPOA and 
counterpunched against his counterpart’s amateurish international 
display.  President Rouhani proclaimed to the collection of world leaders 
that “Iran will not be the first country to violate the agreement” despite 
the arrival of “rouge newcomers to the world of politics.”187  France’s 
President, Emmanuel Macron, in a pointed rejection of President 
Trump’s approach to the JCPOA made it clear that “to denounce [the 
JCPOA] would be a grave error, because it is a good deal”188 and warned 
that it would be a “big mistake” for the United States to withdraw from 
its commitments.189  Interestingly, even Israel’s army chief of staff, Lt. 
Gen. Gadi Eisenkot has hailed the JCPOA for its success in delaying the 
“Iranian nuclear vision by 10 to 15 years.”190 
By decertifying the JCPOA in October 2017, President Trump 
essentially was attempting to absolve himself of any responsibility as to 
the deal’s future, because he merely “punt[ed] the question of whether it 
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should be torn up to Congress.”191  Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act, a President’s decision to “decertify” the Iran deal opens a 
sixty-day window for Congress decide whether or not to reimpose 
previously removed sanctions on Iran.192  Congress, naturally 
dysfunctional and stagnant, did not act in the allotted sixty-days, creating 
a situation where President Trump was “back to square one, with the deal 
he promised to scrap still in place.”193 
The prospect of President Trump leading the United States away 
from the JCPOA skyrocketed when he dismissed Secretary of State 
Tillerson and National Security Adviser McMaster, replacing them with 
CIA Director Mike Pompeo and former U.S. ambassador to the United 
Nations, John R. Bolton.194  Both men are Trump loyalists who have not 
only denounced America’s involvement in the landmark nuclear 
agreement,195 but have also publicly professed their antipathy toward Iran 
by pushing for military strikes196 and calling for the American-led 
overthrow of its government.197  JCPOA onlookers warily and correctly 
noted that the hiring and promotion of these “Iran Hawks”198 “spell[ed] 
trouble for the nuclear deal”199 because it further called into question 
America’s sincerity vis-à-vis its commitments to the deal and 
underscored the creation of “one of the most hawkish national security 
teams of any White House in recent history.”200 
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The JCPOA now stands at a crucial crossroads where the 
international community is able to uniquely gauge and dictate its success 
or failure.  Iran has repeatedly protested the fact that the United States, 
when still a party to the deal, had not fully lifted its banking sanctions, 
which spooked international investors.201  Clyde and Co., a leading 
commerce and trade law firm, estimated that “more than half of global 
companies interested in doing business with Iran are holding back for fear 
of running afoul of sanctions . . . .”202  Speeches from Mr. Khamenei, 
such as the one marking the 2016 Persian New Year, stating that “[the 
Americans] removed the sanctions in paper only,” further underscore this 
existing frustration and dilemma.203 
Frustration has been mounting over the looming threats still posed 
by penalties from the U.S. Treasury Department that have made European 
banks very anxious about providing credit for large-scale projects in 
Iran.204  Such angst is not ill-founded; it enjoys factual backing.  “Several 
big banks, including HSBC and BNP Paribas were fined billions of 
dollars for dealing with Iran . . . .”205  Harvard Business Review echoed 
such a reality when they wrote that “financial institutions remain anxious 
because of the $15 billion in fines banks have paid for sanctions 
violations over the last five years and the difficulty of avoiding the U.S. 
financial system for bank transactions related to Iran.”206  Because 
American regulations and sanctions are still in place, it remains virtually 
impossible for businesses to transfer money to and from Iran—a 
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quandary that has been enormously exasperating for many Iranians.207  
Perhaps the most important aspect which must be addressed in order to 
properly appreciate the gravity and sensitivity of the JCPOA’s unfulfilled 
expectation is the lingering ambiguity surrounding the fate of European 
companies who have already started or wish to start conducting business 
with Iran. 
Secretary Kerry underscored this fact during his tenure when he 
acknowledged that “[u]nfortunately there seems to be some confusion 
among some foreign banks and we want to try and clarify that.”208  Even 
European lawmakers decry the fact that the “lack of clarity from the U.S. 
is causing a lack of certainty for companies . . . .”209  Their incertitude 
stems from the fact that OFAC “has made it very clear that no payments 
linked to Iran may be processed through the U.S. financial system.”210  
This web of dos and don’ts for potential investors is further compounded 
by the reality that American sanctions against Iran concerning non-
nuclear-related matters remain in place.  An executive director for The 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) echoed such a point when he 
stated, “[r]egrettably, remaining U.S. sanctions and related uncertainty 
have hindered the return of global banks to the Iranian market and 
continue to hamper large-scale investment and trade.”211  Such measures 
“effectively block any transactions with Iran . . . based on the U.S. dollar, 
because they would ultimately have to be cleared in the US.”212 
Caught in the middle of this economic strong-arming are innocent 
Iranians who recently lost access to one of the most ubiquitous elements 
in today’s globalized society, Apple’s App Store.213  “Under the 
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regulations governing U.S. sanctions, the App Store cannot host, 
distribute, or do business with apps or developers connected to certain 
U.S. embargoed countries,” namely Iran.  Such measures unfairly target 
the Iranian public and stifle their personal economic prosperity and 
livelihood.  An Iranian entrepreneur expressed his frustration that, “[n]o 
one with an iPhone can download any of the popular apps any more.  
Imagine if in the U.S. you wouldn’t be able to get Uber on your phone.”214 
Because Congress maintains a plethora of robust sanctions against 
Iran to use as both a barking and biting force against companies that wish 
to do business with and in Iran, the JCPOA’s potential has been largely 
neutered.  For this principal reason, economic relief hasn’t flowed into 
Iran as robustly as expected and likely will not now that the United States 
has abdicated its involvement therewith. 
On the JCPOA’s one-year anniversary, the U.S. Treasury Secretary 
stated: 
We are meeting our commitments under the deal, by lifting 
nuclear-related sanctions as specified in the JCPOA and by 
providing clear and timely guidance to government and 
private sector partners about engagement with Iran that is 
now permitted.  And Iran has benefited economically under 
the deal, significantly increasing its oil sales, opening more 
than 300 new bank accounts with foreign banks, negotiating 
billions of dollars of new lines of credit, and seeing new 
planned foreign direct investment increase by more than $3 
billion.215 
This statement, while technically true, was misleading and 
contributed to the lingering dichotomy between American and Iranian 
viewpoints regarding post-JCPOA developments.  Moreover, the 
statement set the tone for the misleading talking points vis-à-vis Iranian 
sanctions relief that were later touted and exaggerated by the United 
States in an effort to muzzle Iranian protests regarding the dearth of 
foreign monetary influx. 
It should not go unsaid that Iran has enjoyed significant economic 
gains since the JCPOA’s implementation.  Per the IMF, Iran’s real gross 
domestic product has grown by 7.4 percent.216  “Iran’s oil exports have 
tripled since late 2015,” which has “helped offset large and unexpected 
production outages” elsewhere, lowering international gas prices at the 
pump.217  In the ever-lucrative tourism sector, “more than 6 million 
travelers visited Iran in the year ending March 2017, up fifty percent on 
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the previous year and three times the number in 2009.”218  According to 
the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a hawkish think tank, 
which relentlessly advocates for anti-Iran polices, Iran’s inflation rate 
plummeted to eight percent in 2016, down from eighty percent in 2013, 
because of its ability to sell oil on the international market.219  It is 
forecasted that Iran’s economic growth “will stabilize around 4 to 4.5 
percent annually or higher over the next five years’ with an overall 
growth pace of about four to five percent in the 2017–18 fiscal year.”220  
These statistics reflect the incremental nature of investments by foreign 
firms in Iran such as those by French automobile manufacturer Renault, 
which has agreed to increase its production in Iran, setting a goal of 
producing 300,000 cars annually by 2022.221 
Such analysis is not to suggest that Iran has not benefited at all since 
the JCPOA’s implementation, quite the contrary.  Rather, the argument 
rests on the view that despite the many remaining barriers, these are the 
fragments of relief from the JCPOA, which have found their way into 
Iran.  With that, the potential for the originally expected windfall of gains 
would be even more substantial if the United States were to give clear 
assurances to Iran-looking international business investors.  Yet, “while 
Iran has been successful in selling its oil, United States banking 
restrictions that predate the nuclear dispute have obstructed increased 
trade between Iran and its European business partners.”222  Assessing the 
Iranian energy sector, SVB Energy International found that “dozens of 
deals” aimed at developing and reintegrating “Iran’s energy and other 
industrial sectors [have] stalled because of [the] remaining U.S. 
sanctions . . . [because] banks and businesses that use the U.S. financial 
system are afraid of violating sanctions on Iran for its support of terror 
groups and human rights violations.”223  Evidently, these institutions 
“view the risk of violating U.S. sanctions as too great.”224 
Statements coming out of Iran regarding Iranian irritation with these 
hindrances demonstrate how fragile the JCPOA’s survival truly is.  Iran 
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argued that President Trump violated the nuclear agreement by 
pressuring companies not to engage in business with Iran.225  According 
to Foreign Minister Zarif, this was a “violation of not the spirit but of the 
letter of the J.C.P.O.A. of the nuclear deal.”226  The head of Iran’s atomic 
energy agency warned that the landmark nuclear deal could collapse 
because of America’s foot-dragging on the pledge of sanctions relief.227  
Thus, the question is: Why should Iran forgo its nuclear capabilities in 
exchange for being put in virtually the same situation it was in before 
signing the JCPOA?  Iran’s former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
repeatedly touted Iran’s resilience in the face of sanctions when he was 
in office proclaiming, “[s]anctions cannot stop the Iranian nation.  The 
Iranian nation is able to withstand the pressure of the United States and 
its allies.”228  There is some truth to that argument.  Despite the fact that 
Iran has lived, and continues to live, under American and international 
sanctions for nearly four decades, Iran has still found ways to successfully 
launch its first indigenous satellite into orbit, send animals into space for 
testing, and develop drones to protect and advance its geopolitical 
interests.229  Iran is not desperate. 
In one of the post-JCPOA’s most telling episodes, the U.S. Treasury 
Department, under the Obama administration, delayed granting key 
licenses to the world’s two aviation goliaths, Boeing and Airbus, for 
nearly a year; these key licenses were required to greenlight Iran’s 
purchase of 180 passenger aircraft from the duopoly.230  Such 
 
 225  Baker, supra note 11. 
 226  Baker, supra note 11. 
 227  Iran Warns Enduring Sanctions Threatening Nuclear Deal, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 26, 
2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/iran-warns-enduring-sanctions-threatening- 
nuclear-deal-160926173350502.html. 
 228  Louis Charbonneau, Ahmadinejad Says Sanctions Won’t Stop Iran, REUTERS (May 4, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/nuclear-treaty-ahmadinejad-idAFN041288962010050 
4. 
 229  Fredrik Dahl & Parisa Hafezi, Iran Launches Satellite; U.S. Expresses Concern, 
REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-satellite-idUSTRE5120NN2 
0090203; Michael Sheridan, Iran Brags It Launched Rocket Into Space . . . With Mouse, 
Turtles & Worms, NY DAILY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world 
/iran-brags-launched-rocket-space-mouse-turtles-worms-article-1.193971; Paul McLeary, 
Iranian Drones Now Hitting Rebel Targets in Syria, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 18, 2017), http://for 
eignpolicy.com/2016/02/29/iranian-drones-now-hitting-rebel-targets-in-syria/. 
 230  Jon Gambrell, US Grants Airbus, Boeing a Chance to Sell Airplanes to Iran, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 9, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/3824bea5c2e342eea5fa6a762 
80595f0/airbus-says-us-grants-license-planes-iran-deal; David Lawder, U.S. Treasury’s 




2018] THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION 433 
intervention by the U.S. Treasury Department was vital for Boeing231 and 
Airbus232 to lawfully sell Iran aircrafts as “Washington still demands that 
even non-American manufacturers wishing to sell to Iran to obtain an 
export license if their products include material made in the United 
States.”233  All such deals are dependent on U.S. licenses because of the 
heavy use of American parts in commercial airplanes.234  These 
obstructive requirements forced Iran to wait until 2017 before it could 
accept the first delivery of aircrafts, and even then Iran only received a 
mere fraction of the aircrafts it purchased.235  Airbus, alone, has ninety-
five undelivered planes bound for Iran in its backlog.236  Iran’s 
desperation to obtain modern aircrafts and aviation parts represents a 
microcosm of underlying vexation surrounding American policies.  A 
history professor at the University of Illinois, Behrooz Ghamari, stated, 
“Airplanes have real political and symbolic significance for the Iranian 
government.”237  Whenever “ordinary people and politicians referred to 
how immoral and cruel these sanctions are, they brought up the example 
of the Iranian airlines and their aging commercial fleet.”238 
Iran’s aviation sector has been decimated at the hands of American 
sanctions.  Due to the damaging effects of long-standing sanctions, Iran 
was forced, and continues in large part to be forced, to rely on obsolete 
aircraft dubbed “flying coffins,” which make air travel less safe for 
civilians.239  It is no surprise that “Iran has one of the world’s worst air 
safety records;” the Flight Safety Foundation found that since 1979, 
“1,672 people have died in 92 aircraft-related accidents.”240  Addressing 
this issue in the post-JCPOA era should not take place at such a delayed 
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rate.  OFAC has the authority to grant companies specific licenses, which 
authorize particular transactions that might otherwise be banned by the 
remaining sanctions regime.241  It must do so at a more practical and 
prudent pace instead of revoking them.  It is for this reason that Iranian 
dissatisfaction is reaching a boiling point, leading to a meeting between 
Foreign Minister Zarif and his international counterparts on the sidelines 
of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly to discuss “some 
differences” over the application of the nuclear deal, “the first ministerial-
level meeting between [the parties] since the deal went into effect.”242 
A persuasive argument can be made, buttressed by uncontroverted 
facts, that since President Trump’s took office he repeatedly violated the 
explicit terms of the JCPOA.243  Contrary to popular belief, the deal does 
not only require the United States to lift nuclear sanctions in exchange 
for a cap on Iranian nuclear enrichment.244  Rather it is more complex and 
reciprocal.  The JCPOA required the United States not to inhibit Iran’s 
reintegration into the global economy. Section 26 committed the U.S. 
(and its allies) “to prevent interference with the realisation [sic] of the full 
benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified” in the deal.245  Section 
29 committed the U.S. and commits Europe to “refrain from any policy 
specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation 
[sic] of trade and economic relations with Iran.”246  Section 33 committed 
them to “agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of trade, 
technology, finance and energy.”247 
The Trump administration likely violated these clauses numerous 
times since assuming power.  It has been reported that at a May 2017 
NATO summit, “Trump tried to persuade European partners to stop 
making trade and business deals with Iran.”248  Then, in July, Trump’s 
director of legislative affairs boasted that at a G20 summit in Germany 
that Trump had “underscored the need for nations . . . to stop doing 
business with nations that sponsor terrorism, especially Iran.”249  Both of 
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these lobbying efforts appear to violate America’s pledge to “refrain from 
any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the 
normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran.”250 
The Trump administration may have committed other violations as 
well.  Section 22 of the deal specifically obliged the United States, 
subject to some restrictions, to “allow for the sale of commercial 
passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran.”251  To do 
business with Iran, any U.S. company—or even any foreign company 
that gets more than ten percent of its components from U.S. companies—
must get a permit from OFAC.252  Under the Obama administration, 
OFAC began issuing these permits, albeit slowly.253  In November 2016, 
for instance, OFAC allowed the sale of 106 planes by Airbus to Iran 
Air.254  But since the Trump administration took over, requests 
concerning permits to export planes to Iran had been piling up as OFAC 
had not responded to aircraft sales licensing requests since the first of 
such licenses were issued during the Obama administration.255  Erich 
Ferrari, a lawyer in Washington who works on sanctions issues, said there 
has “definitely been a shift.  Certain transactions that we’ve seen licensed 
in the past under the Obama administration are now being denied.”256 
It is thus quite clear why Iran’s most senior figures and politicians, 
despite their patience and adherence to the deal, were dropping not-so-
subtle clues to the United States that sanctions relief was lacking and 
jeopardizing the future of cooperation vis-à-vis the nuclear issue.  Abbas 
Araqchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, made it known that: “If our 
interests are not met under the nuclear deal, there will be no reason for us 
to continue.”257  Such statements should have served and should continue 
to serve as a warning to all remaining parties that the JCPOA is not 
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impervious to inaction. 
After such a tumultuous history between the United States and Iran, 
the slightest perception of a lack of goodwill by either party runs the risk 
of fatally endangering what remains of the JCPOA.  Not only has 
President Trump failed spectacularly in reassuring the negotiating parties, 
including Iran, that the JCPOA is here to stay, he has actively turned up 
the rhetoric and implemented additional sanctions while at the same time 
deserting the deal.258  President Trump, emboldened by a highly partisan 
Congress, runs the risk of needlessly entering “confrontation without 
conversation.”259  Unfortunately, the clock is ticking toward the collapse 
of the international community’s last best hope to remedy an enduring 
and vexing international problem, a problem that has far reaching 
consequences.  Each party would be wise to practice prudence and 
commit themselves more seriously to quell any concerns or 
misconceptions in order to save the framework of cooperation that 
currently exists between Iran and the international community. 
    i. Trump Nukes the Iran Nuke Deal 
On May 8, 2018, the world’s worst kept secret was finally made 
official: The United States, under the direction of President Trump, would 
unilaterally abandon and violate a successful multilateral international 
nuclear agreement, endorsed by the UN Security Council, by defaulting 
on its commitments to JCPOA.260  This announcement was accompanied 
by the reality that the wide array of Iran-related sanctions, particularly 
those aimed at Iran’s oil sector, that were lifted under the terms of the 
deal would now snap back over the course of the next 180 days.261  
America’s European allies, long-anticipating such a rash move, 
expressed “regret and concern” over the decision, while President 
Trump’s predecessor and the chief architect of this historic agreement, 
President Obama, slammed the announcement as “misguided.”262  Sadly, 
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such developments are not new or uncommon under the Trump 
presidency.  What is worrying in this particular circumstance, though, is 
that “[t]here is no strategy” in Washington for what transpires next—an 
alarming hallmark of President Trump’s modus operandi.263 
The American decision to violate the JCPOA and reinstate sanctions 
against Iran presents many known and yet known consequences that will 
be felt by all parties involved.  In particular, it will create tension among 
America’s allies when seeking to confront Iran, collaterally punish 
ordinary Iranians, hurt the American consumers and American economy 
in addition to escalating already fraught regional tensions in the Middle 
East. 
At the outset, such a decision isolates the United States at a 
particularly precarious moment in international politics when geopolitical 
developments seem to be in unceasing flux.264  This latest decision could 
cause a serious rupture with European allies already seething from the 
Trump administration’s threatened steel tariffs and withdrawal from the 
Paris climate agreement.265  Moreover, given that the European 
signatories, along with Russia and China, plan to stick with the JCPOA, 
President Trump’s dream of exacting maximum leverage, in the form of 
punitive multilateral sanctions that were imposed under the Obama 
administration, could be unattainable.266  Particularly telling is the fact 
that Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union have made clear 
they would view a reinstatement of American oil-related sanctions as a 
violation of the nuclear agreement.267  France has condemned as 
“unacceptable” the U.S. move to reimpose sanctions on companies 
trading with Iran, arguing European companies should not have to pay 
for an American decision.268  European officials have signaled they will 
not pull out of the deal as their stated strategy is to seek to protect their 
companies from any U.S. sanctions, using so-called blocking legislation 
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drawn up in the 1990s.269 
Rather than punishing the Iranian government, President Trump’s 
move to dispose of American involvement in the JCPOA and restore 
sanctions against Iran will squeeze the average Iranian.270  For the 
working class and low-income people, new sanctions and renewed 
isolation will mean fewer jobs, less security and more poverty.271  As a 
result, the poor will be forced to change their priorities: the time and 
energy they could dedicate to peaceful protests will be consumed by 
struggling to provide bread.272  As for the middle class and people living 
in large cities, renewed sanctions, buttressed by the threat of war, present 
an existential threat to their meager livelihood.273  Such a reaction may 
well make the middle class become more conservative and more 
receptive to the Iranian government’s narrative.274  This pivot would stem 
from the fear of an economic collapse and chaos that will cause them to 
give up demands for equality and justice in order to protect their hard-
earned relative comfort.275  When it comes to the government itself, as 
the Obama years proved, a choked-off economy and its accompanying 
black markets allowed a group of powerful people to monopolize the 
economy.276  Sanctions never forced the Iranian government to cut back 
its security and military budgets.277  Instead, certain factions within power 
merely directed wealth to the top or transferred it overseas, and deployed 
all their political and military capital to protect it.278 
The decision to nix American commitments to the deal will also 
inevitably hurt U.S consumers.279  Crude oil prices hit three-and-a-half-
year highs after President Trump made his announcement concerning the 
JCPOA.280  As U.S. sanctions come back into force, Iran’s oil production 
will take a hit causing a spike in oil prices, which will further increase 
retail gas prices, that are already expected to be at the highest summer 
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levels in four years.281  This would occur just in time for the summer 
driving season and the midterm elections.282  Experts have predicted that 
“thousands of American jobs in various locations of the U.S. would be in 
jeopardy”283 if the U.S. Treasury Department followed through with its 
stated promise of revoking already-issued licenses that allowed U.S. 
companies, particularly those in the aviation sector, to negotiate and 
transact business deals with Iran.284  Any such revocation would cause 
Boeing to miss out on $20 billion worth of contracts it has signed with 
Iran.285  This development would represent a huge lost opportunity for 
the Chicago-based company.286  It cannot be underscored enough that 
“[t]he U.S. economy will face headwinds from prices that will come as a 
natural result of this [decision].”287 
Halfway around the world, the reality of a JCPOA without the 
United States will inevitably lead to more instability in the Middle 
East as the geopolitical tensions there will only become more 
pronounced.288  Within forty-eight hours of Trump’s announcement 
that he was pulling the U.S. out of the deal, Iran and Israel came closer 
than ever before to a direct military confrontation.289  The Israelis are 
increasingly worried about Iran’s establishment of a permanent military 
presence in Syria and have begun taking things into their own hands with 
airstrikes.290  Iran’s actions in Syria are first and foremost about 
preserving the Syrian government as part of the “axis of resistance”—a 
longstanding alliance between Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, among 
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others.291 Iran is also seeking to consolidate its hard-won position in the 
power competition between the main stakeholders in the Syrian conflict: 
Turkey, the United States, and the Syrian government, along with their 
respective regional and international allies.292  Syria provides Iran with 
vital strategic depth, allowing it to project power through the Levant, and 
gives it a gateway to Hezbollah, enhancing Iranian deterrence of Israel.293 
In light of its objectives and Israeli aggression against “Iranian 
targets—both facilities and people,”294 Iran exhibited restraint by not 
directly responding to Israel’s strikes in Syria.295  That all might have 
potentially changed when, one day after the Trump administration’s 
upending of the JCPOA, twenty missiles from Syria struck the Israeli-
occupied Golan Heights,296 which Israel quickly attributed to the Quds 
Force, the overseas arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.297  
This attack was provocative, assuming the Israeli military was right to 
attribute it to Iran, as it marked the first direct attack by Iranian forces 
in Syria on what Israel considers its own territory.298  From Tehran’s 
perspective, Israeli strikes against positions linked to Iran and its allies in 
Syria, alongside belligerent U.S. and Saudi rhetoric, are aimed at 
undermining Iran’s deterrent capability.299  Provoking a military standoff 
with Israel is not an Iranian priority.300  Nevertheless, the specter of war 
between Israel and Iran is rising and President Trump has done nothing 
to temper this volatile and unpredictable situation.301 
Despite the United States’ unilateral actions, the JCPOA is “not 
dead” yet.302  President Rouhani said that he will hold talks with the deal’s 
other signatories in the coming weeks, before the sanctions kick back in, 
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to determine whether the deal would continue to benefit Iran.303  Foreign 
Minister Zarif said he would embark on a round of international 
diplomacy to try and save the deal.304  This glimmer of optimism is 
tempered with President Rouhani’s warning that Iran could now restart 
enriching uranium “without any limitations” if its “national interests” 
were not met and the deal could not be preserved at the conclusion of 
further dialogue with the remaining signatories.305  Without the 
United States’ active support, the deal faltered over the past years.306  
Now, with the United States actively opposed, it will likely collapse, 
and soon.307  It might be nice for Americans to think that the United 
States, a democracy, exhibits more integrity and demonstrates its 
trustworthiness more than Iran, but, as it relates to commitment to the 
JCPOA, this would be a fantasy.308 
With a population of about eighty-two million and substantial oil 
reserves, Iran represents a largely untapped market with the potential 
for tremendous growth, a rare economic opportunity for Western 
companies who wish to further their global reach.309  It is no surprise 
that exports from the European Union to Iran increased by about one-
third in 2017 to about $13 billion.310  However, in light of President 
Trump’s decision, many economic goliaths consider Iran as “not an 
environment in which other big companies will see any reason to 
commit capital.”311  German Chancellor Angela Merkel said President 
Trump’s decision to renege on the deal was a serious blow because it 
would be difficult to keep the deal alive, given that a “huge economic 
power has left.”312  In light of this reality and the fact that it remains 
unclear if the deal can be preserved in the longer term without 
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American support, U.S. sanctions could force European companies to 
choose between retaining access to the American market or the Iranian 
one.313  Most, if not all, will turn away from Iran instead of risking painful 
U.S. penalties, meaning that Iran will see diminishing economic returns, 
thus frustrating the main reason it signed the accord in the first place.314  
If this is indeed the case, the international community can be confident 
that Iran will not sit on its hands in the face of a major U.S. provocation 
and unfulfilled economic promises.315  It is at this exact juncture that 
President Rouhani’s warning of Iran resuming its “enrichment without 
any limitations” could become a reality.316 
Two key sanctions deadlines are important in gauging the 
longevity of the JCPOA.  The first such deadline is August 6, 2018, 
by which time companies must wind down holdings of Iranian 
sovereign debt or Iranian currency.317  Any person or entity that 
assists the Iranian government with acquiring or purchasing U.S. 
dollar banknotes will be subject to American sanctions by that date.318  
Additionally, August 6 is critical because that is when sanctions are 
set to snap back into effect, hindering Iran’s trade in gold and other 
precious metals, graphite and coal, metals such as aluminum and 
steel, the country’s automobile sector and luxury exports such as 
Iranian-origin carpets and caviar.319 
The second crucial date to be mindful of is November 4, 2018.320  
On this date, sanctions targeting companies conducting business with 
Iran’s oil industry are reinstated, including penalties against foreign 
financial institutions that conduct significant transactions with 
the Central Bank of Iran.321  On top of that, the U.S. will impose sanctions 
on Iran’s energy sector and on petroleum-related transactions with certain 
designated firms.322 
What is likely to unfold is a relative period, perhaps several weeks, 
of calm while the remaining signatories try to salvage the deal by 
negotiating some marginal enhancements.323  They might succeed if they 
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can assuage Iranian pride.324  Then again, they might not.325  If this is not 
resolved before the wave of sanctions roll in, Iran will reserve the coveted 
“moral high ground”—ceded by President Trump—to resume its nuclear 
program, should they so choose.326  The reality is that with the return of 
sanctions, Iran now has a strong incentive to resume its atomic-weapons 
activities.327  Thus, the potential nuclear crisis that may soon unfold will 
not be Iran’s fault, but rather that of the Trump administration and those 
who prodded it to abort the one mechanism in the past thirty-five years 
that has reliably and verifiably constrained Iran’s nuclear program.328 
If Iran decides the JCPOA is in fact dead, it could kick out IAEA 
inspectors and begin enriching uranium without any of the deal’s 
safeguards in place.329  In light of this, a rational thinker would 
understand the premise that if you are worried that Iran is determined to 
get a nuclear weapon, it is better to have the inspectors in the country and 
on the sites as opposed to not.330  Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran can 
enrich limited quantitates of uranium up to 3.67%, well below the ninety 
percent weapons grade uranium needed to build a bomb.331  Those limits 
are still verifiable so long as Iran exhibits what would now be optional, 
unparalleled and unilateral good faith by adhering to the JCPOA’s 
monitoring mechanisms in the face of American absence.  President 
Trump has repeatedly proclaimed that he considered having “no deal” to 
be a better alternative than having “this deal”—the world will soon judge 
whether or not he was right.332  Either way, the United States is far weaker 
as a result of President Trump’s decision to sabotage the JCPOA, not only 
because it broke its commitment to implement the deal in good faith, but 
also because it imperiled the possibility of attaining diplomatic 
settlements by undermining its credibility in diplomacy.333 
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IV. AMERICA’S INTERESTS 
Despite their heated rhetoric and opposing worldviews, the United 
States and Iran share significant mutual interests.  With the Middle East 
in such disorder, having the ability for these two countries to see eye-to-
eye is a potential that should be embraced and utilized instead of 
dismissed and overlooked.  While it would be naïve to say the JCPOA 
realigned the United States and Iran on major international issues, that 
same naïveté applies to those who refute the notion that areas of mutual 
interests exist between the two countries.  Moreover, independent of any 
shared interests with Iran, the United States should have had a great 
interest in seeing the JCPOA succeed in order to employ it as a 
negotiating tool to convince other countries, such as, North Korea to 
denuclearize. 
A. The Iranian Youth 
The United States has a huge democratizing incentive in assuring 
that ordinary Iranians benefit from the JCPOA.  Iran’s young, 
westernized population actually serves as an ironic foil to its eastern, 
religious-dominated system of governance.  It is well documented that 
Iranian hard-liners face a large and formidable population of high-spirited 
youth who are fatigued by decades of religious edicts and isolation at the 
hands of their government.334  Over sixty percent of “Iran’s eighty million 
people are younger than 30 years old,” which means they were not born 
until after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that transformed their country.335  
In fact, the “Iranian youth are among the most politically active in the 57 
nations of the Islamic world.”336  Such activity came to a head with the 
Green Movement in 2009 when Iranians poured into the streets to 
challenge what they viewed as a rigged re-election of President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in a mass protest, which shook Iran to its core.337  The 
Green Movement and its push for “people power” and democratic change 
was, in fact, the precursor to the Arab Spring, which swept across the 
Middle East.338  Recently, Iran, once again, experienced a national 
movement of unrest which saw tens of thousands of protestors rise up in 
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what is likely the most severe internal crisis the country has faced this 
decade.339  As in 2009, the Iranian youth, this time aggrieved by their 
bleak economic prospects and double-digit unemployment rates, are 
playing a vital role in putting the government on notice.340 
Poignantly, the Iranian youth share a commonality with the United 
States in that both have been very much opposed to Iran’s conservative 
leadership—a fact demonstrated by the youth’s overt resistance to their 
government’s traditionalist tendencies.341  The very fact that the Iranian 
population is “young, well-educated and primed to benefit from the 
country’s opening to the rest of the world” presents the United States with 
an opportunity to connect with a mass of people from which it has long 
been disconnected.342  The youth in Iran “so deeply long to incorporate 
American and Western values and traditions into their everyday lives.”343  
Many Iranians “enjoy aspects of Western culture, seen through illegal 
satellite dishes or over internet connections that subvert government 
censorship,” but feel trapped by their leaders.344  The most involved, 
impressionable and westernized bloc, in Iran is its youth who are stuck in 
limbo facing what seems to be an unceasing binary pull between East 
versus West, Iran versus the United States, and theocracy versus 
democracy.  Iran’s Supreme Leader has even publicly proclaimed, 
“[Iranians] don’t have any problem with the American people.  What we 
are dealing with here is the politicians.”345  Not surprisingly, 
Washington’s position differentiating between Iran and Iranians is nearly 
identical to that of Tehran’s distinction between America and Americans.  
President Trump tweeted several times in early 2018 about Iran’s 
“corrupt government” and his “respect” for “[t]he great Iranian 
people.”346 
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The United States has the “transformative power of markets” such 
as “Hollywood, hip-hop, the Internet, democracy and free speech.”347  
Iran has already embraced American influence through everything “from 
nose jobs to Steve Jobs.”348  Moreover, nearly fifty million Iranians are 
estimated to be using smartphones, equipped with social media and 
various communication apps.349  If America’s goal is to reach the young 
Iranian populous and garner Iranian support on other fronts such as 
eradicating terrorism and assuring regional stability, engaging and 
embracing the youth is “likely to work a lot better than ostracism, covert 
action, and repeated threats of military force, which merely galvanize 
Iranian nationalism and help justify continued repression by 
hardliners.”350 
These facts all favor America’s vision for Iran.  The United States 
should be mindful not to sabotage potential international investors 
seeking to invest in Iran.  Should the United States permit Iran to enjoy a 
modest near-term boost in its economic morale, America’s long-term 
democratization interests in the country would be greatly advanced. 
B. Geopolitics: Terrorism and International Security Concerns 
After peeling back the prevailing layers of distrust and rhetoric 
between the United States and Iran, it becomes evident that at least one 
significant overlap exists between their mutual interests—the need to 
address and eliminate specific terrorism-related and national security 
issues.351  Chief among these concerns are the growth and spread of 
terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, buttressed by the threat of 
their international “wanna-be” adherents who blindly follow these caustic 
ideologies.352  “[B]rainwashed by petrodollar-financed demagogues,” 
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these terrorists live to put American lives in their crosshairs on a daily 
basis.353  The seemingly endless terror attacks, highlighted by the 
tragedies in the United States, Paris, Brussels and the Middle East, 
underscore the need for “global cooperation” aimed at eradicating 
extremist terror groups and preventing them from gaining a greater 
foothold.354 
Iran’s Foreign Minister has publicly made known that “there are 
multiple arenas where the interests of Iran and other major stakeholders 
intersect.”355  Iran now, perhaps more than ever, holds several cards of 
great value as it relates to activities in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.356  As these 
zones of conflict come into greater focus, Iran is a key player who can 
help dictate the fate of the entire region as the whole Middle East is 
seemingly on the teetering edge of complete collapse.  It is patently naïve 
to overlook the fact that: 
“[t]he United States will have a hard time solving problems 
in the Mideast without Tehran’s cooperation: in Lebanon, 
where it backs the Shiite militant group Hezbollah; in Syria, 
where it is propping up the government of President Bashar 
al-Assad; in Iraq, where it supports the government of Prime 
Minister Haider al-Abadi and trains powerful Shiite militias; 
and in Yemen, where to some extent, it is backing the Houthi 
rebels against the government.”357 
President Obama even acknowledged such a reality when he 
proclaimed that, “it’s important for [Iran] to be part of that 
conversation.”358  Such a viewpoint is not merely one of a former 
President who is invested in seeing the JCPOA remain intact, it is also 
echoed by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan because of the 
recognition that “Iran is part of the solution” to many of the Middle East’s 
most volatile conflicts.359 
Ensuring the JCPOA’s survival has the potential to “serve as a 
prelude to contextualizing the region’s most far-reaching complications 
in a manner that is inviting and conducive for Iranian participation.”360  
President Obama again recognized this geopolitical reality, saying “[t]he 
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truth of the matter is that Iran will be and should be a regional power.”361 
i. Yemen 
Yemen, one of the Arab-world’s poorest countries, has been 
devastated by a war between rebel forces and neighboring Saudi Arabia 
that has caused unimaginable internal strife.362  Yemen is representative 
of the larger context in which American and Iranian interests potentially 
are aligned.  Foreign Minister Zarif has indicated willingness to sit down 
and discuss the country’s most pressing humanitarian issues with the 
United States, saying, “Yemen would be a good place to start.”363  Iran 
has “offered a reasonable and practical approach to address this painful 
and unnecessary crisis,” and called “for an immediate cease-fire, 
humanitarian assistance and facilitation of intra-Yemeni dialogue, 
leading to the formation of an inclusive, broad-based national unity 
government” in the hopes of ending a conflict that was needlessly started 
and has been needlessly protracted.364 
America’s image certainly is very much invested in Yemen and what 
unfolds there.  This is especially true in light of President Trump’s 
unrelenting order of Yemini drone strikes and his approval of a botched 
raid which resulted in the deaths of a Navy SEAL and an eight-year old 
American girl.365  The United States, through its intelligence assistance 
and arms sales to Saudi Arabia, amounting to $110 billion under 
President Obama alone, is “complicit in this carnage.”366  This military 
collaboration proved to be bipartisan when President Trump signed a 
massive $100 billion-plus arms deal with the Saudis only months after 
taking office.367 
Children are being killed in airstrikes at a staggering rate; sixty 
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percent of the 785 child casualties caused by airstrikes were attributed to 
American-sold,368 Saudi-flown aircrafts.369  Surely the United States does 
not want to again be in the news across the world as being an active 
supporter in a war that has killed “more than 6,500 people, displaced 
more than 2.5 million others and pushed one of the world’s poorest 
countries from deprivation to devastation.”370  The people of Yemen are 
facing dire circumstances as the humanitarian crisis in Yemen “looks like 
the Apocalypse.”371  Their “suffering is largely a result of monstrous 
misconduct by a Saudi-led coalition that is supported by the United 
States . . . .”372  The opportunity to remedy this tragic situation is within 
plain sight.  The United States and Iran both have national interests as it 
relates to the Yemini despair, so why not create a climate where further 
cooperation can develop organically?  Iran has offered its hand; the 
United States should extend its as well.  After all, “[t]here’s an American 
imprint on every civilian life lost in Yemen.”373 
    ii. Iraq and Syria 
Iraq and Syria both have all the hallmarks of a proxy battlefield, civil 
strife, and sectarian antagonism.374  They are both in the midst of utter 
destruction at the hands of terrorist organizations who will stop at nothing 
to hunt and kill innocent civilians, including Americans.375  These terror 
groups, and the extent of their claimed land, have ebbed and flowed in 
both countries in the face of vigorous battles—yet they have still 
managed to linger, much to the chagrin of peace seekers.376 
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Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who is no friend of Iran, has 
advocated for “coordination” with Iran in Iraq due to its influence, reach, 
and contiguous boundaries with the war-torn nation.377  He, like many 
others, has begun to recognize the importance of Iran’s role in Iraq’s 
stabilization by presenting the idea of Iran “provid[ing] some assets to 
make sure Baghdad doesn’t fall.”378  The two most influential outside 
players in Iraq, the Unites States and Iran, have the ability to jointly bring 
stability to the war-ravaged country.379  If the situation in Iraq is not 
tempered, it would serve, not only as an embarrassing reminder of failed 
American intervention, but also as a breeding ground for terrorists across 
the border in Syria who continue to seek the overthrow of its President, 
Bashar al-Assad. 
For policymakers seeking to invoke meaningful leadership change 
in Syria, “the choice is stark: the devil you know, or a pack of rapacious 
demons.”380  It is clear that, “[i]f Assad were to fall, the chief beneficiary 
would be the very Islamist forces that the United States is bombing.”381  
The Trump administration’s messages, as revealed by the President 
himself, and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, have 
been extremely incoherent as they relate to Syria and Assad’s governing 
prospects moving forward.382  President Trump’s limited, but 
strategically inconclusive April 2017 and 2018 missile strikes on Syrian 
airbases and other facilities demonstrate how fraught the geopolitical 
implications of this arena truly are and how such efforts may be nothing 
more than an “exercise in futility.”383  Because of the looming uncertainty 
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surrounding a potentially viable replacement for Assad, any deviation 
from the status quo would amount to a random guess at best.  Through a 
very strategic domestic approach to the Syrian conflict, President Assad 
has masterfully positioned himself to serve as the lesser of two evils in 
the eyes of domestic and foreign audiences, while simultaneously 
parlaying the rise of ISIS’s radicalism into portraying himself as a de 
facto U.S. ally.384 
Influential voices, such as Ryan C. Crocker, a former U.S. 
ambassador to Syria and other Middle Eastern countries,385 and General 
Sir David Richards,386 the United Kingdom’s former military chief, have 
advocated for Assad to remain in power.  Both American and Iranian 
interests recognize an Assad-led Syria as the most favorable outcome of 
the Syrian conflict.387  In fact, “for several years, the Israelis appeared to 
prefer that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad survive in power, fearing 
that any alternative would be far worse.”388  Despite the ongoing internal 
conflict in Syria, Israel’s Defense Minister has already proclaimed that 
“Assad has emerged victorious in the battle,” further underscoring the 
importance of American and Iranian cooperation in the country.389 
The Iranian position is almost parallel to that of America’s regarding 
the Syrian quandary.390  While neutralizing Sunni-based terrorism is not 
an explicit national security priority for Iran as compared to its more vital 
concentration of retaining regional influence, the net result ultimately 
yields the same reality: an amalgamation of American and Iranian 
interests.  Through its overt and sizeable support for President Assad and 
wholesale aid in the battle against Wahhabi terrorism, Iran has blatantly 
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terror movements—particularly ISIS and Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham 
(formerly Jabhat al-Nusra)391—are not too far apart from one another.392  
Due in large part to the aligned interests of the Americans, Iranians, and 
Russians, as well as their varied contributions toward fighting extremists, 
“ISIS has already sustained heavy losses in men and real estate in Iraq 
and Syria.”393  With ISIS losing ground daily and just barely clinging on 
to realty and relevance, the effects of American and Iranian cooperation 
could not be more evident.  Iran, much like the United States, has waged 
an almost identical war against the very same terror groups that seek to 
wreak havoc in Europe and America.394  President Obama reiterated this 
when he acknowledged, “[W]e’re not going to solve the problems in 
Syria unless there’s buy-in from the . . . Iranians . . . .”395 
These two hotbeds of terror have raised shared concerns for the 
leaders and citizens of the United States and Iran.  If these nations can 
shelve long-standing fear in favor of pragmatism, they could make 
substantial gains in these volatile arenas.  By understanding and 
embracing the unique intermingling of American and Iranian interests, 
policy-makers in the United States should work toward salvaging and 
strengthening the JCPOA, rather than subverting and sullying it.  They 
must communicate to Iran-oriented investors that their existing financial 
ventures will not be penalized under the existing web of American 
sanctions, rather than leading foreign investors down a path of obscured 
legal ramifications that do nothing but impede the survival of the JCPOA. 
C. The Endangered Prospect of Denuclearization and 
International Arms Control 
Thousands of miles away from the Middle East, sits an isolated, 
paranoid, attention-seeking regime that, despite its recent charm 
offensive and sudden about-face, has seemingly been hell-bent on 
amassing nuclear weapons in order to reach an “equilibrium” of military 
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force with the United States.396  In North Korea, Kim Jong-un rules a 
country that neglects the well-being of its own citizens, has virtually no 
international allies and has declared its “final goal” to make “U.S. rulers 
dare not talk about military option for [North Korea].”397  Since coming 
to power in 2011, Kim Jong-un has tested more missiles than his father 
and grandfather combined.398  Coupling this armed, insecure, and 
dangerous dictator with an equally unpredictable and chauvinistic 
President Trump, could spell disaster for the international community. 
i. North Korea 
President Trump and his comments have not only exacerbated the 
rhetorical war of words with the unpredictable regime in Pyongyang, but 
have also fanned the flames of nuclear war with its young and enigmatic 
leader, Kim Jung-un.  Despite President Trump’s insistence that “all 
options are on the table” as it relates to a potential military strike on North 
Korea, others believe such talking points are merely bluster.399  While 
serving in his capacity as President Trump’s chief strategist, Steve 
Bannon, said in an interview, “Until somebody solves the part of the 
equation that shows me that ten million people in Seoul don’t die in the 
first 30 minutes from conventional weapons, I don’t know what you’re 
talking about, there’s no military solution.”400  This has led President 
Trump and Kim Jong-un, among others, to conclude that the North 
Korean problem can only be solved through unprecedented face-to-face 
diplomatic negotiations aimed at resolving the decades-old standoff 
between the two nations.401  This once unimaginable meeting is slated to 
unfold in Singapore on June 12, 2018, after Kim Jung-un extended a 
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goodwill gesture to the United States by releasing three American 
prisoners.402  And this is where the JCPOA comes into focus. 
A special adviser to the South Korean President publicly said that 
“if the US had spent even one fifth of the time and effort on the North 
Korean issue compared with the Iranian case, then the North Korean 
nuclear issue could have been resolved.”403  Such a sentiment only 
underscores the strength and positivity the JCPOA and negotiations can 
have on seemingly intractable issues.  What the overall JCPOA 
experience demonstrates is that the diplomatic success yielded therein 
can be replicated, and potentially also upended, in other arenas as well, 
namely North Korea. 
The critical catch-22 for President Trump lies in his calculus of 
America’s countervailing interests in Iran and North Korea.  From his 
perspective, the JCPOA was “an embarrassment to the United States.”404  
Yet, a total withdrawal therefrom now begs the North Koreans to mull 
over the prospect that after months or years of negotiations, any potential 
arrangement would be an utter waste of time as the American side would 
renege on its commitment at some point down the line, thus further 
escalating the already heightened tensions between the two sides.405  The 
message North Korea now can discern from America’s deviation from 
the JCPOA is: ”why negotiate with the United States if this president or 
the next one can just throw out any agreement?”406  Naturally, “[t]he 
North Koreans will wonder about whether one can have credible 
negotiations with the United States” and question whether Washington 
would stand by and honor its international commitments if one were to 
be reached.407  Iran’s Foreign Minister, mindful of the uncertainty 
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surrounding the JCPOA’s survival, warned of this exact potential in April 
2018 when he said that an American withdrawal from the JCPOA would 
send a “very dangerous message” to those who wish to negotiate with the 
United States because it would create the impression that at the end of the 
day, the operating principle of the United States is ‘what’s mine is mine, 
what’s yours is negotiable.’”408 
For the United States, its commitment to the JCPOA was always 
much larger than monitoring Iran’s nuclear program, it spoke to the very 
notion of American credibility and reliability.  Wendy R. Sherman, the 
chief negotiator of the nuclear accord, warned that “if the president pulls 
back on the Iran deal, given Iranian compliance” with its terms, “it will 
make diplomacy on North Korea almost impossible because U.S. 
credibility will be shot.”409  Any weakening or abrogation of America’s 
obligations to the JCPOA hampers Washington’s ability to resolve other 
pressing international issues. 
That is, if deals with the United States cannot be relied upon, 
President Trump will give Kim Jong-un and North Korea one more 
justification to keep chasing its nuclear ambitions and preemptively 
sabotage the prospects for any potential nuclear deal.  And in light of the 
recent American stance toward the JCPOA, observers on the world stage 
are left asking themselves why North Koreans would believe that the 
Americans, over the long haul, would honor a deal any president 
strikes?410  Put simply, the collapse of the JCPOA would serve to 
undermine the high-stakes talks between Washington and Pyongyang.411 
President Trump’s unyielding criticism of, threats to, and 
abandonment of the JCPOA do not create a conducive environment for 
another potential diplomatic win vis-à-vis nuclear non-proliferation.  As 
the world has seen, the JCPOA has been instrumental in capping and 
verifiably monitoring a once unchecked nuclear program that many 
countries viewed as a threat to regional and international stability.  In 
order to parlay the JCPOA into a similar achievement with the North 
Koreans, there must be certainty that any negotiated resolution, should it 
get that far, between the United States and North Korea would be 
honored.  President Trump’s actions vis-à-vis his May 8 JCPOA 
announcement proved to North Korea that American guarantees “can be 
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reversed anytime.”412  Constant threats of terminating or withdrawing 
from negotiated agreements do not elicit confidence for concessions from 
other prospective parties. President Trump either does not fully 
appreciate such a dynamic or is simply dismissive of it. In either case, the 
United States should be very mindful about the language and course of 
action it employs in the aftermath of its JCPOA retreat, because, in many 
respects, the North Korean regime is leaps and bounds more threatening 
than the exaggerated danger a denuclearized Iran poses to the world. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Far from being the Faustian bargain many cynics branded it as, the 
JCPOA has yielded concrete, verifiable compliance as it relates to Iran’s 
once-unregulated nuclear program.  This precious opportunity is fleeting 
by the day as both sides become more susceptible to the behavior, 
rhetoric, and outlook that created the pre-JCPOA climate of distrust.  The 
world must not let inane chauvinism or indolent acceptance of the status 
quo dictate the decisions of tomorrow.  On July 20, 2015, audacious 
diplomats united together to prove, once more, diplomacy was not 
obsolete.413  All parties involved in the creation and culmination of the 
JCPOA expended a considerable amount of political risk and capital in 
order to make this deal a reality. And yet, one might wonder how this 
deal will survive the many tumultuous days to come with naysayers 
barreling down on either side.  But maybe these detractors are the driving 
force, for they raise the stakes.  The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
must survive for the simple reason that the cost of failure is just too great. 
As the thirteenth-century Persian poet Rumi famously said: 
“Patience is not sitting and waiting, it is foreseeing.  It is looking at the 
thorn and seeing the rose, looking at the night and seeing the day.”414  Let 
us heed these ageless words and not be complacent simply because a deal 
has been reached, but instead let us foresee the promise it personifies and 
work to ensure its endurance. 
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